

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM					
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS	
1	C/ES		22 JUN 1972	<i>[Signature]</i>	
2	D/Security		6/22	<i>[Signature]</i>	
2a	DD/PTOS				
3	D/S				
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks:					
<p>Attached is a memorandum on uniform controls. The DDS may call to inquire as to the status of this paper since Mr. said he was going to query Mr. Coffey on it.</p> <p>Attached are copies for you and </p> <p>2a. Per our meeting today.</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
				DATE	
				6/21/72	
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21 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Uniform Controls

1. This memorandum is for your information and to alert you to a possible request for action from the DDS.

2. On 10 May, the Office of Security presented at the Deputies' meeting proposals to ease Compartmented Controls. The discussions following the presentation resulted in tasks to the Office of Security to:

(a) Prepare the proposed modifications in the form of a memorandum from Mr. Colby to the DCI and obtain the coordination of the DD's.

(b) Establish a uniform control procedure for both collateral TOP SECRET and Compartmented Controls.

(c) Review this uniform control procedure against the requirements of Executive Order 11652.

3. At the Deputies' meeting on 2 ^{June} May, Mr. Colby expressed continuing interest in the results of Office of Security efforts along these lines and instructed that the uniform control procedure be "no tighter than required by E. O. 11652 for the protection of TOP SECRET material." He also proposed that the collateral TOP SECRET Control System, now under the Central Record Service, be transferred to the Office of Security.

4. The DDS accepted the realignment of TOP SECRET Control functions and the Physical Security Division has been designated as the responsible office. Details are still being worked out.

5. The memorandum on modification of compartmented controls was completed. As you recall the DDS told us not to coordinate it with the Deputies. He asked for our suggestion for an excuse so that he would not have to discuss the matter at the DCI's [] meeting last month. We suggested he say he wanted to review further the possible ramifications of Executive Order 11652. Apparently Mr. Coffey was successful in delaying because the proposals were not discussed. However, he has not returned our memorandum and we don't know just where we stand.

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6. We went ahead and prepared a set of uniform controls to be applied to both collateral TOP SECRET and Compartmented material. We complied with Mr. Colby's instruction to make them no stricter than required by Executive Order 11652. We included some, but not all, of the modifications proposed to ease compartmented controls.

7. [] proposed during the week of 12 June that we not attempt to ease the controls over the relatively small number of collateral TOP SECRET documents. We rewrote the controls accordingly. Recognizing the tremendous volume of compartmented material, we included the waivers given to the DDI in 1963 and 1964 for handling compartmented material. As now constituted, the proposed controls for collateral TOP SECRET are somewhat easier and for compartmented material are somewhat tighter.

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8. There is one entirely new concept in the uniform procedure. We call for the use of ADP in controlling TOP SECRET and compartmented material. We hope to expand on the NPIC ADP system which has been successfully employed over the past three or four years.

9. We are of the opinion that Mr. Colby will use whatever we send forward on uniform controls as prescription for dissemination, accountability and production controls. This opinion is based on the fact that [] has called two or three times and inquired about the progress on uniform controls. We referred him to the DDS. On 21 June Evans said he would call Mr. Coffey to learn the status of the modification paper and the paper on uniform controls. This might result in a call to you. This memorandum may provide material for a response.

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10. We think the paper on uniform controls should be carefully coordinated with all parties concerned and with your approval will start to do so. We anticipate two major problem areas arising from our coordination:

(a) Other Directorates will want the same waivers of compartmented controls granted to the DDI.

(b) Since the controls for collateral TOP SECRET and Compartmented material are the same, the DDI may request that the requirement for Simplex locks in lieu of the barrier be either made uniform for all areas holding TOP SECRET material or that the requirement be eliminated.

11. Attached at TAB A is a copy of the latest version of the uniform controls. We have attached at TAB B a copy of the memorandum for the DCI from Mr. Colby on Proposed Modifications. It is this memorandum that Mr. Coffey continues to hold.

STAT

[]
Acting Chief, Special Security Center

Attachments

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Uniform Security Controls for Collateral
TOP SECRET and Compartmented
Intelligence Material

This memorandum is in response to the Executive Director's request of 10 May and 2 June 1972. It represents a compilation of controls proposed as a uniform system within the Agency to satisfy security needs for both collateral TOP SECRET and compartmented TOP SECRET intelligence material.

1. CONTROL OFFICERS

Agency TOP SECRET and/or Compartmented Control Officers will be designated as needed to receive and facilitate the transmission and control of TOP SECRET documents and to establish offices of record for major organizational components.

2. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBERS

Each TOP SECRET document produced or received by an activity or individual in CIA will bear a TOP SECRET control number which will serve to identify the document for purposes of control and accountability as long as it remains in the Agency.

(a) Documents Originated in CIA

Documents produced in CIA will be assigned a control number by the CTSC in the case of collateral TOP SECRET, and by the compartmented control officer in the case of compartmented intelligence.

(b) Documents Received from Outside CIA

TOP SECRET documents received from outside of CIA will bear the originator's TOP SECRET control number. This number will be used to control the document for the period of retention within the Agency.

3. TOP SECRET LOGS

TOP SECRET documents produced or received by CIA will be recorded by the area TOP SECRET control officer or the compartmented control officer. A log record will be maintained on an ADP form. Each subsequent transfer of a copy of a document outside the area will be recorded on the card or a duplicate card showing date of transfer, recipient and courier receipt number if applicable. There is no requirement for logging TOP SECRET documents that originate and remain within a Directorate. Control cards may be destroyed three years after the documents shown have been destroyed,

downgraded, transferred to Records Center or sent outside of the purview of the control officer. The control card will reflect the TOP SECRET control number, originating office, date of document, copy number(s), number of attachments.

4. COVER SHEETS

A control and cover sheet will be prepared by the control officer for each copy of every TOP SECRET document originated in his area. The cover sheet will remain attached to the document until such time that the document is downgraded or destroyed. New cover sheets will be attached when dispatched outside of CIA. Each control officer who receives the document will sign in the left-hand column and record the date of receipt. Each individual other than the control officer who receives the document will sign in the right-hand column. The cover sheet may be used as a certificate of destruction.

5. TRANSMISSION OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

- (a) TOP SECRET documents may be delivered by any Agency courier service.
- (b) TOP SECRET documents may be delivered throughout the Headquarters Building by any staff officer accredited for access to the material.
- (c) Compartmented TOP SECRET documents are to be delivered only to individuals approved for access to the

material involved.

TOP SECRET MATERIAL TRANSMITTED WITHIN
THE AGENCY

(a) Document receipts need not be used when transmitting TOP SECRET documents solely within a Directorate. The originating office or the receiving control area will maintain an accountability register.

(b) Document Receipt Form 2600 will be used when a TOP SECRET document is transmitted between Directorates or independent offices.

(c) If copy number one of Form 2600 is not returned within 14 days, a followup will be initiated.

(d) The Couriers Classified Mail Receipt Form 240a shall be used as receipt for TS packages.

TOP SECRET MATERIAL TRANSMITTED OUTSIDE
THE AGENCY

(a) Courier Receipts

Couriers Classified Mail Receipt Form 240a will be prepared for each TOP SECRET document or group of documents. The receipts will be numbered serially and the number will be inscribed on the corresponding document receipt and on the envelopes or wrappers. The courier will

sign and enter the date and time of pick-up on the duplicate which will be maintained in the transmitting office.

(b) Document Receipts

A document receipt Form 615 will be prepared in duplicate for each document or group of documents. The original document receipt will be enclosed with the documents in the inner wrapping and the duplicate retained pending return of the original. A follow-up will be made on any document at the end of a two-week period, if receipt is not returned.

6. WRAPPING

(a) TOP SECRET Material Transmitted within the Agency

TOP SECRET documents may be transmitted throughout the Headquarters Building in a single envelope or brief case.

(b) TOP SECRET Material Transmitted Outside the Agency

TOP SECRET information and material shall be enclosed in opaque inner and outer covers before transmitting. The inner cover shall be a sealed wrapper or envelope plainly marked with the assigned classification and address. The outer cover shall be sealed and addressed with no indication of the classification of its contents.

7. DESTRUCTION OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

The destruction of TOP SECRET documents must be accomplished in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and questions concerning the legal authority for the destruction of Government records should be referred to the area records officer. Surplus copies of TOP SECRET documents may be destroyed by burning or pulping. This is accomplished by the custodian or his designee by tearing or shredding into any standard disposal bag. The date of destruction will be recorded in the area TOP SECRET log.

8. REPRODUCTION OF TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

TOP SECRET documents may be reproduced only upon authorization by the originator and reproduction must be limited to the minimum number of copies required for efficient operation. Reproduction copies will be controlled in the same manner as prescribed for original copies.

(a) CIA Produced Documents

Permission to reproduce CIA produced documents will be obtained from the originator if within the area proposing to reproduce or through the appropriate control officer if in another area.

(b) Non-CIA Produced Documents

Permission to reproduce TOP SECRET documents of other than CIA origin will be requested through the receiving control officer.

9. ACCOUNTABILITY

In July of each year the Control Officers will submit their ADP control cards to the Office of Computer Services which will provide a print-out reflecting documents charged to the component, transmitted outside the component and destroyed. It is the responsibility of each control officer to assure that his document holdings are in accordance with this listing by conducting a physical inventory no later than 30 days following receipt of his print-out.

10. WAIVERS

Receipts will not be required for the transmittal of T/K material within the Headquarters Building in that area ^{formerly} ~~formally~~ known as the Special Center. OCI Registry's current procedures will serve in satisfaction of requirements for registration and accountability of T/K material.

The initial point of receipt of COMINT within the Agency will serve as the official registry for record of disposition of such material and it will no longer be necessary to maintain strict accountability of such material among and between other internal control points or registries within the Headquarters Building.

~~SECRET~~

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Copy 9 of 10

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed Modification of Controls
on Compartmented Intelligence

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval. Such approval is contained in paragraph 5.

2. At the last [] meeting you asked that the controls on compartmented intelligence be reviewed. Following a detailed staff study we are agreed on some modification of controls in the high volume COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE Systems.

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3. Capitalizing on the unique personnel and physical security features we will unilaterally try the modifications in the Headquarters Building only. If they work out we might want to take them to the community later.

4. Modifications will not apply to the Atomic Energy Commission's Restricted Data material. TOP SECRET material will be handled within permissible interpretations of the new Executive Order (EO 11652).

5. We think they represent a first step toward easing the bureaucracy without sacrificing sound security and recommend you approve the attached notice to the Agency control officials.

W. K. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HANDLE VIA
~~TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT~~

SECRET

25X1

**SUBJECT: Proposed Modification of Controls
on Compartmented Intelligence**

CONCURRENCES:

Carl E. Duckett
Deputy Director for Science & Technology

Date

Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Date

Thomas M. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Date

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel

Date

John W. Coffey
Deputy Director for Support

Date

The recommendation contained in paragraph 5 is APPROVED:

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

Date**SECRET**

HANDLE VIA
TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

SECRET

25X1

**SUBJECT : Proposed Modification of Controls
on Compartmented Intelligence**

ORIGINATOR:

Howard J. Casborn
Director of Security

Date

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